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Case No. 20160810-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN L. LEGG, JR., 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Legg (Legg II), 2016 UT App 168, 380 P.3d 360 
(Addendum A).  The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-3-102(5) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1.  “Whether the court of appeals erred in overruling its decisions in 
State v. Allen, 2015 UT App 163, 353 P.3d 1266, and State v. Warner, 2015 UT 
App 81, 347 P.3d 846, with respect to the question of whether collateral 
consequences from probation revocations may be presumed.”  Order in this 
case, January 31, 2017. 
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 Standard of Review.  This Court reviews questions of law for 
correctness.  Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2017 UT 14, ¶17, ___ P.3d ___. 
 2.  “If the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal, whether 
this Court should address the merits of Petitioner’s appellate claim that the 
district court failed to apply the court of appeals’ prior mandate on 
remand.”  Order, January 31, 2017  
 Standard of Review.  No standard of review applies.   
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 No constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are directly relevant 
to this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The offenses. 
 Legg was charged with nine offenses in three cases.  See R0677 at 1-2; 
R1007 at 1-3; R3013 at 1.  In December 2009, Legg knocked his girlfriend to 
the floor, tried to strangle her, and—when she tried to call police—
repeatedly hit her head against the floor.  R0677 at 2-3.  That conduct gave 
rise to the first case. 
 A month later, Legg again knocked his girlfriend to the floor and this 
time stomped on her chest.  R1007 at 3.  His girlfriend called police.  Id.  
Officers found Legg hiding in a nearby garage and saw a knife.  Id. at 4.  
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Legg admitted the knife was his.  Id.  Charges in the second case were based 
on that conduct.   
 In a third case, Legg mailed his girlfriend a letter in violation of the 
conditions of a protective order.  See R1007 at 268 (referencing -3013).   
B. Proceedings in the district court. 
 Trial and judgment.  As part of a global resolution of the cases, Legg 
pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in -0677 and weapon possession by a 
restricted person in -1007.  R0677 at 246-54; R1007 at 224-32.  The court 
dismissed the remaining charges in those cases and all charges in -0313.  See 
id.; see also R3013 at 70.  
 The court held a consolidated sentencing hearing and gave Legg two 
concurrent indeterminate prison terms of up to five years on his 
convictions.  R0677 at 246-47; R1007 at 224-25.  The judge suspended the 
prison terms, placed Legg on 24 months’ probation, and imposed 
concurrent 180-day jail terms as a condition of probation.  Id.   
 Probation violation.  Legg was released from jail on January 5, 2012.  
R0677 at 270-03; R1007 at 242-245.  Eight days later, Adult Probation and 
Parole (AP&P) filed a violation report in both cases.  See id.  Legg’s 
probation officer filed an affidavit in support of an order to show cause.  See 
R0677 at 274-75; R1007 at 246-47.  The officer alleged that Legg had violated 
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the terms of his probation by possessing cocaine, using methamphetamine, 
and not being cooperative and truthful with AP&P. See id.  Legg denied the 
allegations.  R0677 at 285; R1007 at 256. 
 On 24 April 2012, the officer filed an amended violation report and an 
affidavit in support of an order to show cause.  R0677 at 292-302; R1007 at 
265-71.  He alleged five violations: 
 1. Legg’s possessing a controlled substance (cocaine); 
 2.   Using amphetamines; 
 3.   Not being cooperative, compliant, and truthful in his dealings 
with AP&P; 
4.   Not establishing a residence of record or having changed his 
residence without approval from AP&P.  
5.   Knowingly associating with a known criminal. 
R0677 at 302; R1007 at 271.  Legg denied the allegations.  R0677 at 305; 
R1007 at 278. 
 Probation revocation.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court found that the State had proved allegations 1, 3, and 4 by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but not allegations 2 and 5.  R0677 at 307-08; 
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R1007 at 279-80; R301:76, 88-91, 94.1  The district court concluded that, based 
on his violent history, Legg was likely ineligible for residential 
rehabilitation and that the jail did not offer programs that would help him.  
R301:127-29.  The court revoked Legg’s probation and executed his original 
prison terms.  R301:127-28. 
C. Legg I—Legg’s first appeal. 
 Legg appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s 
finding that Legg willfully violated his probation by not being cooperative, 
compliant, and truthful in his dealings with AP&P (allegation 3).  Legg I, 
2014 UT App 80, ¶¶20-21.  But the court of appeals held that the district 
court had not adequately identified the evidence supporting its findings 
that Legg willfully violated by possessing drugs or by failing to establish a 
residence (allegations 1 and 4).  Id. ¶¶19, 23, 25.  The court of appeals 
recognized “that a single violation of probation is legally sufficient to 
support a probation revocation.” Id. ¶11 (citing State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 
798, 804 (Utah 1990)).  But the court of appeals was “not confident that, 
standing on its own, the single violation” it affirmed on appeal “would have 
resulted” in revoking probation.  Id. 25.   So the court of appeals remanded 
for the district court to identify the evidence that supported allegations 1 
                                              
1 R301 is the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held May 2, 2012.  It 
is part of the record in both -0677 and -1007. 
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and 4 and to “reassess whether, under all the circumstances,” Legg’s 
“probation should be revoked.”  Id.  
D. Proceedings in the district court on remand. 
 On remand, the State withdrew allegations 1 and 4 and proceeded 
solely on allegation 3, the willful violation affirmed on appeal.  See R377:9; 
see also Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, ¶25.  The parties agreed to forgo an 
evidentiary hearing and to proceed to oral argument.  See R377:9-10.  Thus, 
the only question for the district court was “whether, under all the 
circumstances,” it would still revoke Legg’s probation based on the single 
willful probation violation.  Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, ¶25.   
 At the remand hearing, defense counsel informed the district court 
that Legg had six months left on his original sentence, and that he would 
not be paroled in this case, given that he had “been to prison before and 
revoked before.”  R377:13.  Counsel acknowledged that Legg had “a long 
history in the system,” but argued that he was nevertheless an appropriate 
candidate for probation.  Id.; see R377:14 (“He is not a problem out at the 
prison and he has aged. . . . He’s gonna have a difficult time but he doesn’t 
feel like he’s gonna be using drugs.  He feels strong and I do see he’s aged 
through a lot of these difficult times.”).   
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 The prosecutor argued that Legg’s prison sentence should be 
executed for essentially three reasons:  (1) Legg had an extensive criminal 
history; (2) the original sentencing recommendation was for prison; and (3) 
a single violation was a sufficient basis for reinstating the prison sentence.  
See R377:15.  Legg also addressed the district court and acknowledged his 
long criminal history, which went back to about 1987.  R377:16.  Legg also 
acknowledged that he had previously failed to successfully complete 
probation.  R377:17.  Before ruling, the district court also commented on 
Legg’s history:  “I have dealt with [Legg] on my calendar for some time.”  
R377:19.   
 The district court then ruled that based on the single violation for not 
cooperating with AP&P, it would have revoked and would still revoke 
Legg’s probation even absent any other violation:  “There is no question 
that had I found a violation, looking at his history, looking at the 
recommendation, looking at the opportunity for probation that he had 
received, I would have imposed the original sentence.”  R377:23.  “My 
finding is that based on what information the court had at the time that 
there was a finding [of] a violation of probation [and] that it was properly a 
basis for revoking probation, looking at the entire history of both cases.”  
R377:24-25. 
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 The court made clear that it would reach the same result reassessing 
the question on remand:  “[T]he only question [that] remains is, was the 
revocation of probation sufficient on that one single violation?  And I have 
no question that that would have been my ruling, and that I find that those 
circumstances still support it.”  R377:24 (emphasis added). 
 Accordingly, district court confirmed its revocation of Legg’s 
probation and its execution of his suspended sentences.  R377:24-25; 
R0677:368-69.  
E. Legg II—Legg’s second appeal.2 
 Legg again appealed.  See R0677:360.  But during the pendency of the 
appeal, Legg completed his prison sentence and was unconditionally 
released from custody.  See Utah Department of Corrections letter 
confirming that Legg was discharged from prison on July 15, 2015 (attached 
in Addendum C).3  The State therefore argued that because Legg had been 
                                              
2 Much of the history relevant to Legg’s second appeal is taken 
verbatim from the Court of Appeals’ opinion.  For readability, the court of 
appeals’ history of the case has been reproduced without quotation marks 
or indentation.   
3 Although not included in the record on appeal, this Court may take 
judicial notice of the Department of Corrections discharge letter.  See Utah 
R. Evid. 201 (court may judicially notice fact that is not subject to dispute 
because it can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); see also State ex rel. F.M., 2002 
UT App 340, ¶3, n.2, 57 P.3d 1130 (“Courts may take judicial notice of the 
records and prior proceedings in the same case.”)  
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released from prison and had served the sentence that was reinstated when 
the district court revoked his probation, his case was moot.  Legg II, 2016 UT 
App 168, ¶7.   
 The court of appeals concluded that Legg’s case was moot.  Id.  The 
court of appeals also concluded that the case did not fall within a 
recognized exception to mootness.  Id. ¶16.  In so doing, the court of appeals 
determined that two of its recent decisions—State v. Warner, 2015 UT App 
81, 34 P.3d 846, and State v. Allen, 2015 UT App 163, 353 P.3d, 1266—“failed 
to analyze and apply the collateral consequences exception to mootness 
according to precedent,” and that neither case was “firmly established.”  Id. 
¶¶40-41.  Accordingly, the court disavowed the mootness holdings in 
Warner and Allen.  Id. ¶42.  Analyzing Legg’s appeal in light of established 
prior precedent, the court of appeals found that Legg’s appeal [was] moot 
and that he [had] failed to demonstrate that his case fit[] within a 
recognized mootness exception.”  Id. ¶47.  Accordingly, the court dismissed 
the appeal.  Id.   
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Issue 1.  Whether the court of appeals erred in overruling its 2015 
decisions in Warner and Allen.  The court of appeals correctly overruled 
Warner and Allen, two less-than-weighty cases that only a year earlier 
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departed from both this Court’s and the court of appeals’ own extensive 
precedent.  Legg does not dispute that the case is technically moot, i.e., that 
the Court cannot grant him any relief because his sentence has expired.  But 
he asserts that because this is a criminal, not a civil case, this Court should 
presume that the district court’s revocation of his probation will have 
collateral legal consequences harmful to him and should therefore address 
his challenge to the revocation.  That argument is contrary to long-
established law from this Court, the court of appeals, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
 These courts presume that criminal convictions will have collateral 
legal consequences.  For instance, a criminal conviction can be used to 
impeach a defendant’s character or as a factor in determining a sentence in a 
future trial; and a conviction can affect a defendant’s ability to vote.  In fact, 
the collateral legal consequences of criminal convictions are so likely that 
the courts presume they will follow a conviction unless shown otherwise. 
 But the likelihood that a sentencing decision or a probation or parole 
revocation will have similar consequences is far more speculative.  First, the 
defendant would have to reoffend.  Second, it is far more likely that the 
circumstances underlying the sentencing decision or probation revocation 
would have some future effect on the defendant than the fact of the 
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sentence or revocation itself.  Moreover, consideration of the sentence or 
revocation in a later proceeding (or by a prospective employer) is not 
mandatory, but lies in the discretion of the decision-maker and is usually 
only one of a multitude of facts the decision-maker might consider.   
 For these reasons, appellate courts do not presume that collateral 
consequences, which are seldom legally mandated, will follow.  Thus, when 
something other than a criminal conviction is at stake, the courts will find 
an exception to mootness only if the defendant can demonstrate that such a 
consequence will in fact follow. 
 Here, Legg is not challenging his conviction.  Accordingly, this Court 
should not presume collateral legal consequences.  Rather, because Legg has 
not demonstrated that his probation will have any actual collateral 
consequence, this Court should affirm the court of appeals’ holding that the 
case is moot. 
 Issue 2.  If the court of appeals erred, whether this Court should 
address the merits of Petitioner’s claim that the district court failed to 
comply with the court of appeals’ prior mandate.  On certiorari review, 
this Court generally reviews the decision of the court of appeals.  The court 
of appeals did not address the merits of Legg’s claim that the district court 
failed to comply with the court of appeals’ prior mandate.  This Court 
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should therefore remand to the court of appeals to do so.  But if this Court 
decides to address the merits, it should hold that the district court complied 
with the court of appeals’ mandate following the first appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY OVERRULED ITS 
2015 DECISIONS IN WARNER AND ALLEN  
A. The court of appeals incorrectly decided Warner and Allen in 
2015 and correctly overruled them a year later. 
 Legg argued in his second appeal that the district court erroneously 
revoked his probation both when it originally revoked and when it 
reaffirmed its revocation on remand.  He asked the court of appeals to 
reverse the district court’s decision and remand for the district court to 
again determine whether, under all the circumstances, Legg’s probation 
should have been revoked. 
 But Legg’s sentence expired while his appeal was pending, and he 
was released from prison.  The court of appeals, therefore, could not give 
him any relief, and his appeal was moot. 
1. An appeal is moot when the requested relief cannot affect 
the rights of the appellant. 
 The mootness doctrine.  An issue is moot when the requested relief 
cannot affect the rights of the appellant.  State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 
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(Utah 1994); see Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union 
(Local 382), 2012 UT 75, ¶19, 289 P.3d 582.  “The defining feature of a moot 
controversy is the lack of capacity for the court to order a remedy that will 
have a meaningful impact on the practical positions of the parties.”  Local 
382, 2012 UT 75, ¶14.  An issue becomes moot while an appeal is pending if 
“circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby 
rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect.”  State v. 
Black, 2015 UT 54, 355 P.3d 981 (quoting Local 382, 2012 UT 75, ¶14) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Peterson, 2012 UT App 363, ¶4, 293 
P.3d 1103; accord In re Adoption of L.O., 2012 UT 23, ¶8, 282 P.3d 977; State v. 
Hooker, 2013 UT App 91, ¶2, 300 P.3d 1292.  See also Local 382, 2012 UT 75, 
¶15 n.1 (citing Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653-54 (1895), for proposition that 
“an appeal should be dismissed as moot where, by virtue of an ‘intervening 
event’ the appellate court cannot ‘grant … any effectual relief whatever’ in 
favor of the appellant”).  
 When an issue is moot, both judicial policy and the Utah Constitution  
“‘dictate[]’” that the court not issue an advisory opinion.  Featherson v. Utah 
Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2013 UT App 17, ¶3, 295 P.3d 715 (per curiam) 
(citing Sims, 881 P.2d at 841); Local 382, 2012 UT 75, ¶¶16, 19, 20.  A moot 
appeal “‘must be dismissed … unless it can be shown to fit within a 
-14- 
recognized exception to the mootness principle.’”  Hooker, 2013 UT App 91, 
¶2 (citation omitted).  That is because the court has “no power to decide 
abstract questions or to render declaratory judgments, in the absence of an 
actual controversy directly involving rights.”  Local 382, 2012 UT 75, ¶19.   
 Exceptions to mootness.  Utah law recognizes two common 
exceptions to the mootness rule.  The first is for technically moot cases that 
present issues of public interest likely to recur and capable of evading 
review.  This Court discussed that exception in Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, 
16 P.3d 1233, a case dealing with ballot booklets.  That exception applies 
“when a case presents an issue that affects the public interest, is likely to 
recur, and because of the brief time that any one litigant is affected, is 
capable of evading review.”  Id. ¶26; see also Local 382, 2012 UT 75, ¶¶30-33.  
The Court explained that the issues of public interest which it has addressed 
under this exception are generally “class actions, questions of constitutional 
interpretation, issues as to the validity or construction of a statute, or the 
propriety of administrative rulings.”  Id. ¶27 (quoting McRae v. Jackson, 526 
P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
omitted)).  Defendant does not claim that his conviction falls under the 
“issues of public interest likely to recur and capable of evading review” 
exception. 
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 The other exception is for a case that is technically moot, but will 
nonetheless likely result in negative collateral legal consequences.  This 
Court discussed that exception in Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981).  
The Court explained that “it is now clearly established that ‘a criminal case 
is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal 
consequences will be imposed on the basis of the criminal conviction.’” Id. 
¶45 (emphasis added).  “Such collateral consequences may include the use 
of the conviction to impeach the petitioner’s character or as a factor in 
determining a sentence in a future trial, as well as the petitioner’s inability 
to vote.”  Id. (emphasis added) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 
(1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968)).    
 But the Court also explained that other criminal cases “entail no 
collateral legal consequences of the kind that result from a criminal 
conviction.”  Id.  That was true for Duran, who petitioned the district court 
for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that prison officials had violated his 
constitutional rights by transferring him from medium to maximum 
security.  Id. 45.  The district court denied Duran’s petition for the writ, and 
Duran appealed.  Id.  But at the time this Court addressed Duran’s appeal, 
Duran had been returned to medium security.  Id.  The court held that the 
case was moot.  The Court could give Duran no relief, and the 
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administrative decisions he challenged did not entail legal consequences of 
the kind “that result from criminal convictions.”  Id. 
 Utah’s law is consistent with federal law.  Federal law has long 
recognized the mootness doctrine and will dismiss an appeal as moot 
“where, by virtue of an ‘intervening event’ the appellate court cannot ‘grant 
… any effectual relief whatever’ in favor of the appellant.”  Mills v. Green, 
159 U.S. at 653-54.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly 
dismissed federal criminal appeals because they were moot and the Court 
could provide the defendants with no relief.  See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 
U.S. 1 (1998); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982); cf. United States v. Juvenile 
Male, 131 S.Ct. 2860 (2011) (juvenile offender’s appeal moot where court 
could provide no relief). 
 But the U.S. Supreme Court also recognizes exceptions to the 
mootness doctrine.  In a number of criminal cases, it has held that an appeal 
was not moot, even though the defendant had served his sentence, because 
the defendant’s conviction would likely result in adverse collateral legal 
consequences.  In Sibron v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged 
“the obvious fact of life that most criminal convictions do in fact entail 
adverse collateral consequences.”  See 392 U.S. at 53-55 (citing Fiswick v. 
United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); 
-17- 
Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957)).  Under the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s law, the mere possibility that a conviction will result in such 
consequences preserves a criminal case from dismissal for mootness.”  
Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55.   
 Challenges to convictions.  Under both Utah and federal law, the 
difference between criminal cases where the collateral consequences 
exception applies and those where it does not is the nature of the 
defendant’s challenge.  Even though a defendant’s sentence has expired, if 
he challenges his conviction, the courts presume that the conviction will have 
adverse collateral legal consequences—actual consequences that are 
imposed by law.  For that reason, this Court has explained that a challenge 
to a conviction constitutes an exception to the mootness rule.  See Duran, 635 
P.2d at 45.  Accordingly, when a defendant challenges a criminal conviction, 
the Court will presume that the conviction will carry collateral legal 
consequences.  Id.  The case will therefore be dismissed as moot only if it is 
shown that “there is no possibility that any collateral consequences will be 
imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.’”  Duran, 635 P.2d at 45 
(citing Sibron, 392 U.S. at 57).   
 This too is consistent with federal law.  See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 57 n.17 
(although sentence had been completed while appeal was pending, adverse 
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consequences could flow from New York state law permitting use of 
conviction to impeach character of a defendant in later criminal proceeding); 
Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237 (criminal conviction may preclude a person’s 
engaging in certain businesses, serving as a labor union official, serving as a 
juror, or voting); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 632 n.2 (1968) (criminal 
conviction could result in ineligibility for licensing under state and 
municipal license laws); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 221 (1946) 
(conviction could subject defendant to adverse legal consequences affecting 
deportation).    
 Challenges to sentences, probation and parole revocation, etc.  But 
where a defendant challenges something other than his conviction—for 
example, his sentence, his probation or parole revocation, or a prison 
segregation order—collateral consequences like those attendant to a 
criminal conviction are not likely.  In those cases, Utah law holds that 
expiration of the sentence renders the case moot unless the defendant can 
show some actual adverse legal consequence, some concrete injury-in-fact.  
Accordingly, the courts do not presume the existence of such consequences 
in a case where the defendant is not challenging his conviction.   
 As explained, in Duran, Duran challenged the district court’s denial of 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that prison officials had 
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violated his constitutional right by transferring him from medium to 
maximum security.  635 P.2d at ¶45.  By the time this Court addressed the 
appeal, Duran had been returned to medium security.  Id.  The Court held 
that the appeal was moot.  Id.  It could give him no relief, and the 
administrative decisions he challenged did not entail legal consequences 
like those resulting from criminal convictions.  Id.   
 The court of appeals has also addressed exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine in numerous cases.  It has distinguished challenges to convictions 
from challenges to sentencing, probation and parole revocation, stalking 
injunctions, and prison discipline orders.   
 In a series of cases, the court of appeals has held that an appeal from a 
sentence is moot once a defendant has served his sentence, been released 
from jail, and had his case closed.  See State v. McClellan, 2014 UT App 271, 
339 P.3d 942 (addressing challenge to sentences where sentences had been 
served); State v. Matthews, 2014 UT App 169, 332 P.3d 406 (addressing 
challenge to probation revocation where sentence had been served); 
Featherson v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2013 UT App 17, 295 P.3d 715 
(addressing challenge to decision denying parole where sentence had been 
served); Hooker, 2013 UT App 91 (addressing challenge to probation 
revocation where sentence had been served); State v. Peterson, 2012 UT App 
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363, 293 P.3d 1103 (addressing challenge to sentence where sentence had 
been served); cf. Towner v. Ridgway (Ridgway), 2012 UT App 35, ¶2, 272 P.3d 
765 (addressing challenge to stalking injunction where injunction had 
expired); State v. Moore, 2009 UT App 128, 210 P.3d 967 (addressing 
challenge to discipline imposed while defendant was in jail awaiting 
sentencing where defendant had been sentenced and transferred to prison).   
 Each of these cases held that the relief sought was impossible or of no 
legal effect because the sentence had been served and the case was therefore 
moot.  In Hooker, the court of appeals noted that Hooker had not alleged, 
much less demonstrated that either the collateral consequences or public 
interest exception applied.  2013 UT App 91, ¶3.  In McClellan, the court 
addressed McClellan’s claim of possible legal consequences, but held that 
the consequences that he proffered were not imposed by law and thus did 
not qualify as collateral consequences in the mootness context.  2014 UT 
App 271, ¶5.  Nor did the appeal fit within the exception for an alleged 
wrong “capable of repetition yet evading review.”  Id. ¶6.  In Peterson, the 
court expressly stated that because Peterson did not challenge his 
conviction, “the collateral consequences attendant to an unlawful conviction 
[were] not at issue.”  2012 UT App 363, ¶5.  In Ridgway, the Court refused to 
presume that Ridgway’s expired civil stalking injunction imposed negative 
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collateral legal consequences on him.  2012 UT App 35, ¶¶7-11.  The court 
reiterated, “Unless a party is challenging a criminal conviction, we will not 
presume that such collateral consequences exist.”  Id. ¶7 (emphasis added).4  
In Moore, the court held that the decision to place Moore in solitary 
confinement would have no bearing on his ability to vote, engage in 
businesses, or serve on a jury; it could not be used to impeach his character 
or as a factor in determining a sentence in a future trial; and it did not 
require that the parole board deny parole in a future hearing.  2009 UT App 
                                              
4 This Court has held that collateral negative consequences in a civil 
case can constitute an exception to mootness.  In In re Giles, 657 P.2d 285 
(Utah 1982), this Court addressed an appellant’s appeal from a decision 
ordering defendant’s involuntary commitment after he was found not 
guilty of aggravated assault by reason of insanity.  Id. 286-86.  Defendant 
argued that the district court has erroneously ruled that the evidence 
sufficed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that, among other things, he 
suffered from a mental illness at the time of his hearing, that he posed an 
immediate danger of physical injury to others or himself, and that he lacked 
the ability to engage in a rational decision-making process regarding his 
treatment.  R287-89.   
While the appeal was pending the defendant was released from the 
hospital.  Id. 286.  This Court nevertheless addressed his claims.  Id. 287.  
Noting that the doctrine of collateral consequences is chiefly applied in 
criminal cases, the court held that the doctrine was “equally applicable to 
patients of mental hospitals who face similar deprivations of liberty.”  Id. 
This decision does not support Defendant’s claim that the decision he 
challenges in the instant case—revocation of his probation—presents 
adverse collateral legal consequences.  It simply holds that the deprivation 
of liberty applicable in nonvoluntary commitment is sufficiently similar to 
the nonvoluntary commitment following a criminal conviction to merit 
appellate review even where technically moot.   
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128, ¶¶13, 17. Any collateral consequences resulting from Moore’s prison 
disciplinary record were hypothetical, and the court would not presume 
them.  Id. ¶¶17-19. 
 The court of appeals has also entered a series of orders dismissing 
appeals as moot because the defendants had served their sentences and 
consequently no relief was available on appeal.  See State v. Reynolds, 
20140706-CA, order dated December 18, 2014 (sentence completed); State v. 
Craner, 20130526-CA, order dated February 27, 2014 (challenge to trial 
court’s order terminating probation was moot; defendant had completed his 
jail confinement and probation was terminated; unlike collateral 
consequences of criminal convictions, “collateral consequences regarding 
the effect of terminating probation as unsuccessful are merely hypothetical 
rather than actual adverse consequences that would defeat mootness”); State 
v. Herrera, 20130368-CA, order dated January 23, 2014 (challenge to district 
court’s sentencing decision moot where sentence completed and defendant 
released from jail; no collateral consequences alleged or demonstrated).   
 Utah’s law is consistent with federal law.  Federal law also presumes 
that convictions carry collateral legal consequences, but that sentences, 
probation and parole revocations, and most other criminal matters do not.  
In Lane v. Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Williams’ challenge to 
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the court’s failure to advise him of a mandatory state parole requirement 
was moot because Williams had completed parole and been released.  455 
U.S. 624, 626-33 (1982).  Revocation of Williams’ parole and incarceration for 
his parole violation subjected him to no legal collateral consequences.   Id.  
“At most, certain non-statutory consequences [might] occur; employment 
prospects, or the sentence imposed in a future criminal proceeding could be 
affected.”  Id. 632.  But, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned, the “discretionary 
decisions that are made by an employer or a sentencing judge … are not 
governed by the mere presence or absence of a recorded violation of parole; 
these decisions may take into consideration, and are more directly 
influenced by, the underlying conduct that formed the basis for the parole 
violation.  Any disabilities that flow from whatever respondents did to 
evoke revocation of parole are not removed—or even affected—by a District 
Court order that simply recites that their parole terms are ‘void.’”  Id. 632-
33. 
 In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that Spencer’s challenge to allegedly unconstitutional parole revocation 
procedures was moot because his sentence had expired.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court declined “to presume that collateral consequences adequate to meet 
Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement resulted from [Spencer’s] parole 
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revocation.”  Id. 14.  Citing Sibron, the Court noted that it had, in recent 
decades, “been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has 
continuing collateral consequences.” Id. 8 (emphasis added). But, the Court 
observed, Spencer did not “attack his convictions for felony stealing and 
burglary”; rather, he asserted “only the wrongful termination of his parole 
status.”  Id. 9.     
 The U.S. Supreme Court noted that in the context of criminal 
convictions, “the presumption of significant collateral consequences is likely 
to comport with reality.” Id. 12.  But, the Court continued, the “same cannot 
be said of parole revocation.”  Id.  Citing Williams, the Court noted that it 
had hitherto refused to extend its “presumption of collateral consequences” 
to parole revocation.  Id. 12 (citing 455 U.S. at 624).  The Court observed that 
it “was not enough that the parole violations found by the revocation 
decision would enable the parole board to deny [Williams] parole in the 
future,” where the violations did not render him ineligible for parole, but 
were “‘simply one factor, among many, that may be considered by the 
parole authority.’”  Id. 13 (quoting Williams, 455 U.S. at 639-40).  Moreover, 
the parole violations remaining on Williams’ record could not affect a 
subsequent parole determination unless he again violated the law.  Id.  
Finally, these “nonstatutory consequences” were “dependent upon ‘[t]he 
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discretionary decisions … made by an employer or a sentencing judge … 
not governed by the mere presence or absence of a recorded violation of 
parole.’”  Id. (quoting Williams, 455 U.S. at 632-33).   
 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court declined “to presume that collateral 
consequences adequate to meet Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement 
resulted from petitioner’s parole revocation.”  Id. 14.  The Court recognized 
that Spencer could avoid a dismissal by showing a concrete injury-in-fact, 
but it rejected the four injuries that he proffered because they did not 
constitute concrete injuries-in-fact.5  Id. 14-16.   
 In sum, under both Utah and federal law, the courts presume that a 
conviction will result in a negative collateral legal consequences and, unless 
the State can show that such consequences are impossible, will hear a 
defendant’s challenge to a conviction even if he is no longer in custody.  But 
                                              
5 Spencer gives guidance about what does not constitute a concrete 
injury-in-fact.  Spencer argued he had suffered the following injuries-in-fact:  
(1) his parole revocation could be used to his detriment in a future parole 
proceeding, (2) the revocation could be used to increase his sentence in a 
future sentencing procedure, (3) the revocation could be used to impeach 
him in a future criminal proceeding, and (4) the revocation might be used 
directly against him in a future criminal proceeding.  Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14-
16.  The U.S. Supreme Court rejected them all.  The Court held that the 
asserted injuries depended on Spencer’s again violating the law and on 
discretionary decisions by the prosecutor and the presiding judge in any 
future criminal proceedings.  Id.  They were thus merely hypothetical, not 
actual consequences or injuries.  Id.  Moreover, they were not imposed by 
law.  Id. 
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the courts will not presume that a challenge to a parole revocation or any 
other sentence (such as probation) will result in negative collateral legal 
consequences.  Thus, when a defendant challenges his sentence or probation 
or parole revocation, the case will be moot if his sentence has expired unless 
the defendant can show a concrete injury-in-fact. 
 Stated another way, where a defendant challenges his conviction, the 
State has the burden to show that no collateral legal consequences are 
possible.  But when a defendant challenges something other than his 
conviction—for instance, his sentence or his probation revocation—the 
defendant has the burden to show that collateral legal consequences 
actually exist, i.e., that there is a concrete injury-in-fact. 
 As explained above, the court of appeals has recognized and applied 
this precedent in numerous decisions.  But the State acknowledges that in 
two anomalous 2015 cases the court of appeals did not.  In State v. Warner, 
2015 UT App 81, 347 P.3d 846, and State v. Allen, 2015 UT App 163, 353 P.3d 
1266, the court of appeals declined to dismiss as moot challenges to 
probation revocations, even though the defendants had served their 
sentences and been released from jail.  In Warner, the court addressed 
Warner’s challenge to his probation revocation, even though Warner had 
completed his sentences and had been released from jail.  2015 UT App 81, 
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¶1.  In Allen, the court addressed Allen’s claim that trial counsel had 
rendered ineffective assistance in connection with his probation revocation, 
even though Allen had also been released from custody.  2015 UT App 163, 
¶¶1 & 4 n.2.  Neither case involved a challenge to a criminal conviction.  
Rather both Warner and Allen challenged the revocation of  probation.  
Warner, 2015 UT App 81, ¶1; Allen, 2015 UT App 163, ¶1.   
 The Allen court stated that it was “not convinced that Allen face[d] no 
collateral legal consequences as a result of his felony conviction and revoked 
probation terms.”  2015 UT App 163, ¶4 n.2 (emphasis added).  But Allen 
did not challenge his conviction.  Rather, he argued that his trial counsel 
had rendered ineffective assistance by not asserting that he had mental 
health issues as a defense to his probation violation.  Id. ¶1.  Because Allen 
did not challenge his conviction, any collateral legal consequences of the 
conviction were not at issue. 
 Warner challenged his probation revocation, not his conviction.  2015 
UT App 81, ¶1.  But when the State argued that Warner’s enumerated 
consequences were “merely hypothetical or possible,” this Court 
determined that the State’s argument was “based on the standard applicable 
to civil cases, not criminal cases.”  Id. ¶3. 
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 As authority, the court of appeals cited its own decision in Ridgway, 
2012 UT App 35.  The court recited Ridgway’s language that “collateral 
consequences may be presumed when ‘a party is challenging a criminal 
conviction,’ but not in civil cases.”  Id. (quoting Ridgway, 2015 UT App 35, 
¶3).  Ridgway’s language is correct, but it does not support the Warner 
decision.  Collateral legal consequences may not be presumed merely 
because a case addresses criminal proceedings.  Rather, collateral legal 
consequences are presumed when an appellant is challenging a criminal 
conviction.  That is because—as stated—a criminal conviction almost 
always results in legally-imposed collateral consequences.   
 But a defendant’s probation revocation, parole decision, or sentence 
may not be so used.  While probation, parole, and sentencing decisions may 
be considered by courts, employers, and others in making discretionary 
decisions, they do not impose consequences as a matter of law.  The Warner 
court’s decision is therefore anomalous. 
 The Allen court also misread relevant precedent when it rejected the 
State’s mootness argument.  In that case, Allen appealed his sentence 
arguing that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not asserting 
that Allen had mental health issues as a defense for his probation violation.  
2015 UT App 163, ¶1.  While Allen’s appeal was pending, Allen was 
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released from jail.  Id. ¶4 n.2.  The State therefore argued that the appeal was 
moot.  Id.  
 The panel rejected that argument, reading Duran to hold that “in a 
criminal case a [defendant’s] release from custody renders a case moot only 
if there is no possibility of collateral consequences.”  Id.  But in so doing, the 
panel ignored the Duran language that applies this standard only when a 
defendant is challenging a criminal conviction, not when he is challenging 
other decisions that may be made during the criminal process—such as a 
decision to revoke probation. 
 Allen and Warner were anomalous.  Both cases misinterpreted 
governing case law.  Accordingly, this Court should apply the collateral 
legal consequences exception as set forth in its own case law and in the 
court of appeals extensive pre-2015 case law, not as set forth in Warner and 
Allen. 
2. Legg’s appeal is moot because now that his sentence has 
expired, this Court cannot grant him any relief. 
 Legg here is not challenging his criminal conviction.  Rather, he is 
challenging the district court’s revocation of his probation.  He seeks yet 
another probation hearing to ask the district court to reconsider its decision 
to revoke his probation.  But his sentence has expired, and he has been 
released from prison.  Thus, Legg’s appeal is moot.  As explained, an issue 
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becomes moot while an appeal is pending if “circumstances change so that 
the controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested 
impossible or of no legal effect.”  Peterson, 2012 UT App 363, 4.  A new 
revocation hearing will not allow the district court to reinstate his probation 
and give him another opportunity to avoid the prison term ordered as a 
result of his probation revocation. 
 Moreover, because Legg is challenging his probation revocation, not 
his conviction, Utah’s appellate courts will not presume that the probation 
decision will have collateral legal consequences.6  Rather, Legg has the 
burden to show some concrete injury-in-fact—some consequence imposed 
by law that he will actually, not hypothetically, suffer because his probation 
was revoked.  Legg has not met that burden.  For that reason, this Court 
should dismiss his appeal as moot. 
B. Warner and Allen are not rooted in long or firmly established 
legal principles. 
 Moreover, neither Warner nor Allen was rooted in long or firmly 
established legal principles.  See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 
1994).  Legg claims that Warner and Allen properly applied Duran, the 1981 
case from this Court, because “a probation revocation appeal is a criminal 
                                              
6 As noted, Legg does not contend that Utah’s other exception to the 
mootness doctrine, the exception for issues of public interest likely to recur 
and capable of evading review, applies here.   
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case.”  Br.Resp’t at 20.  But that claim rests on a misunderstanding.  “The 
doctrine of collateral legal consequences is chiefly applied in criminal 
cases.”  Towner v. Ridgeway, 2012 UT App 35, ¶7, 272 P.3d 765 (citing In re 
Giles, 657 P.2d 285, 286 (Utah 1982)).  But the doctrine does not apply to any 
and all challenges that arise in criminal cases.  “Unless a party is challenging 
a criminal conviction, the appellate courts will not presume that such 
collateral consequences exist.”  Id. (citing State v. Moore, 2009 UT App 128, 
¶17, 210 P.3d 967) (in turn citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14 (1998)) 
(internal quotation omitted).   
 The issue is not merely whether a case is a criminal rather than a civil 
matter.  The issue is whether a defendant is challenging a criminal 
conviction.  As explained above, under this Court’s decision in Duran, “it is 
now clearly established that ‘a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that 
there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed 
on the basis of the challenged conviction.’”  635 P.2d at 45 (citing Sibron v. 
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)).  But where a defendant is challenging other 
matters in a criminal case—the sentence, probation or parole revocation, 
administrative segregation, etc.—and such a challenge is moot, the 
defendant bears the burden to show that collateral legal consequences 
actually exist and are not merely hypothetical.   
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 As explained above and in the preceding sections of this argument, 
this allocation of burdens has long been mandated by both federal and Utah 
law.  Because neither Warner nor Allen addresses this precedent, neither case 
constitutes weighty authority on the matter.  Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 
(noting that stare decisis effect of case is substantially diminished where 
court fails to explain why it is abandoning a long-established rule).  The 
court of appeals’ 2015 decisions in Warner and Allen were not rooted in long 
or firmly established legal principles, but were instead contrary to long and 
firmly established precedent. 
 Moreover, the State’s Westlaw review of Warner and Allen indicates 
that the only case citing either of them is the court of appeals’ decision now 
on certiorari review before this Court.  Thus, as the court of appeals’ 
reasoned, “it would be problematic to allow the mootness holdings of Allen 
and Warner to stand” and “prudent to take this early opportunity to 
straighten the path of precedent from which those cases departed.”  Legg II, 
2016 UT App 168, ¶42. 
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II. 
IF DISMISSING THE APPEAL WAS ERROR, THIS COURT 
SHOULD REMAND THE CASE TO THE COURT OF 
APPEALS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DISTRICT 
COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THAT COURT’S 
PRIOR MANDATE  
A. If dismissing this appeal was error, this Court should remand 
this case to the court of appeals. 
 If the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal, this Court 
should not address the merits of Legg’s claim that the district court failed to 
comply with the court of appeals’ mandate following his first appeal.  
Rather, the Court should remand the case to the court of appeals to address 
the merits of that claim.   
 On certiorari, this Court reviews “the decision of the court of 
appeals.”  Brierley v. City, 2016 UT 46, ¶18, 390 P.3d 69 (citing State v. Strieff, 
2015 UT 2, ¶12, 357 P.3d 532, rev’d on other grounds, 136 S.Ct. 2056 (2016)).  
Here, the court of appeals did not address the merits of Legg’s claim that 
the district court failed to follow the mandate issued by the court of appeals 
as part of Legg’s first appeal.  Accordingly, if the court of appeals erred in 
dismissing the appeal, this Court should remand to allow the court of 
appeals to address the merits.  Moreover, the court of appeals issued the 
mandate in the first place and could possibly be in a better position to 
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determine whether the district court complied with its mandate than this 
Court is. 
B. If this Court decides to address the merits of this claim, the 
Court should hold that the district court complied with the 
court of appeals’ prior mandate. 
 But if this Court decides to address the merits of the claim, it should 
hold that the district court complied with the court of appeals’ mandate 
following Legg’s first appeal.  As explained in the Summary of Proceedings 
in this brief, when addressing Legg’s first appeal, the  court of appeals 
affirmed the district court’s finding that Legg willfully violated his 
probation by not being cooperative, compliant, and truthful in his dealings 
with AP&P (allegation 3).  Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, ¶¶20-21.  But because the 
district court had not adequately identified the evidence supporting its 
findings that Legg willfully violated by possessing drugs or by failing to 
establish a residence (allegations 1 and 4), id. ¶¶19, 23, 25, the court of 
appeals remanded for the district court to identify the evidence that 
supported allegations 1 and 4 and to “reassess whether, under all the 
circumstances,” Legg’s “probation should be revoked.”  Id. ¶25.  The court 
of appeals recognized “that a single violation of probation is legally 
sufficient to support a probation revocation.” Id. ¶11 (citing State v. Jameson, 
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)).  But the court of appeals was “not confident 
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that, standing on its own, the single violation” it affirmed on appeal “would 
have resulted” in revoking probation.  Id. 25.    
 On remand, the State withdrew allegations 1 and 4 and proceeded 
solely on allegation 3, the willful violation affirmed on appeal.  See R377:9; 
see also Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, ¶25.  The parties agreed to forgo an 
evidentiary hearing and to proceed to oral argument.  See R377:9-10.  Thus, 
the only question for the district court was “whether, under all the 
circumstances,” it would still revoke Legg’s probation based on the single 
willful probation violation.  Legg I, 2014 UT App 80, ¶25.   
 The district court therefore addressed that question.  “There is no 
question that had I found a violation, looking at his history, looking at the 
recommendation, looking at the opportunity for probation that he had 
received, I would have imposed the original sentence.”  R377:23.  “My 
finding is that based on what information the court had at the time that 
there was a finding [of] a violation of probation [and] that it was properly a 
basis for revoking probation, looking at the entire history of both cases.”  
R377:24-25. 
 The court made clear that it had reached the same result reassessing 
the question on remand:  “[T]he only question [that] remains is, was the 
revocation of probation sufficient on that one single violation?  And I have 
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no question that that would have been my ruling, and that I find that those 
circumstances still support it.”  R377:24 (emphasis added). 
 Accordingly, the district court confirmed its revocation of Legg’s 
probation and its execution of his suspended sentences.  R377:24-25; 
R0677:368-69.  In so doing, the district court complied with the court of 
appeals’ mandate. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Court should affirm the court of appeals’ holding that this case is 
moot and that no exception to mootness applies.  The Court should then 
dismiss the case without addressing the merits of Legg’s claim that the 
district court failed to comply with the court of appeals’ mandate following 
his first appeal. 
 If the Court concludes that the case is not moot, it should remand the 
case to the court of appeals to decide whether the district court complied 
with its mandate.  But if the Court instead decides to address the merits of 
Legg’s claim rather than remanding to the court of appeals, the Court 
should hold that the district court did, in fact, comply with the mandate 
following Legg’s first appeal. 
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